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The philosopher Tsang said, "Let there be a careful attention to perform the funeral rites to parents, and let them be followed when long gone with the ceremonies of sacrifice;-then the virtue of the people will resume its proper excellence. (1:9, translated by Legge)
In Indo-European languages, "memory" and "mourn" have the same root, mers, which appears in the Sanskrit smarati, "to reflect," and the Greek merimna, "care" or "sorrow", and mermeros, "anxious." 'Memor', whence the Latin memoria, 'memory', means "mindful," while commemorare originally meant merely an intensified remembering. Mourning is still an intensified remembering, though not necessarily by means of a more explicit or vivid recollection of the departed one. What is at stake in mourning is, on the one hand, a set of appropriate affective responses ("care," "sorrow," "anxiety") and, on the other, a being mindful of the person being mourned, reflecting on him or her. Neither the emotional states nor the reflective mindfulness require remembering in the usual sense of recollective recall, that is, the internal representation of past scenes in which the mourned person figured. In fact, the intensification effected by a genuine commemoration of this person may be diluted or diverted by an overly concerted effort to recall details of such scenes, amounting to a fixation on the particularities of the past rather than on the work of mourning in the present.
This line of consideration helps to clarify at least three otherwise seemingly unrelated phenomena at stake in the Analects:
(1) The prohibition, already long-established by Confucius' lifetime, against referring to the departed one by his or her proper name during rites of burial, mourning, and sacrifice was not merely a matter, as Waley held, of fear that naming the dead might compel their frightening presence.2 Nor can it be strictly a question of paying respect to the dead, as in one traditional interpretation of this puzzling practice. Rather, I think that we should view it as a fitting expression of the general principle that commemorative mourning is best effected in the absence or suspension of fixating particularity, of which the proper name in its referential uniqueness is an exemplar. (One is reminded here as well of the intriguing notion that the author of a literary text is precisely most effective in his or her absence from the text-in an a-nonymity which Derrida has argued is tantamount to the author-as-dead.)3 (2) Freud's theory of mourning emphasizes the introjection of and identification with the departed person. The immediate result is a con-fusion of oneself with the other, a compression in an intrapsychic entity which has no proper name since it is at once myself andthe other. Here, notjust death itself but death's aftermath is "no respecter of persons"-as is evidenced subsequently in the berating of the departed person for having abandoned oneself.4 (One cannot help but think of the abstinence and self-denial, not to mention the sacrifice, required in ancient Chinese mourning rites: is this not the ceremonial equivalent of the process which Freud so characteristically located within the individual psyche?) (3) Indeed, it is ceremony itself that is the third factor in the disparate series of items which are here being knit together into an unexpectedly unified knot. Notice, to begin with, how ceremonies combine the collective and the commemorative by their very nature: thereby giving to 'commemoration' its now normally accepted sense of com-memoration, memorializing with others. (It is also Freud who warns us that wholly private ceremonial actions, such as those of the obsessive, are highly suspect.) A funeral, after all, is collective and commemorative at once: commemorative in being a collective expression of grief, as well as bindingly collective precisely in being an occasion of commemoration. 5 It needs to be stressed, however, that ceremonial action, even though a commiseration or concelebration of persons (or events) past, is not only not dependent on explicit remembering of that to which tribute is being paid but thrives in its very absence. I would not go so far as to say that ceremonies or rituals always defend against or obviate such remembering (though sometimes they surely do so-to the relief of participants who do not wish to be reminded in detail of the mourned-for object). Instead, they effect another kind of remembering, an unexplicit and often unthematized 'remembering-through' the ritualistic action itself. When Fingarette, commenting on the Analects, writes that "the ceremonial act is the primary irreducible event," 6 he is pointing to the phenomenon at stake here. A ceremony such as that of burying or mourning, even if it concerns someone who from now on is entirely past in relation to oneself and whose essence is thus to have been ( Wesen ist was gewesen ist)-such a ceremony, bearing on such a person, is nevertheless "irreducible" to a group of elicited memories. The memories are not masked, much less repressed; they are suspended and superseded by the ceremonial occasion, an occasion of collective remembrance.
Contrast this situation with that which is described at the very beginning of the Here exact recollection is in order: when, at day's end, one thinks back in detail over the course of events to examine one's conduct in business, friendship, and instruction. To fail to remember accurately at this time is to fail at the very task of self-scrutiny. What emerges most forcefully is just how much the Confucian conception of ritualistic action represents a middle way between the cosmic ambitiousness of an "archaic ontology" 10 and the finitistic pessimism of psychoanalysis. It does so by thinking of the repetition effected by ceremony as collective and commemorative in a manner that is at once manifestly modest and subtly selfexpansive.
IV
The very notion of repetition brings us into the domain of time, and it is quite tempting to proceed (as does Eliade) by distinguishing between a "sacred time" (that reenacted in the ritual) and a "profane time" (all nonritualized experience). To do so is to continue in the Platonic tradition of discriminating between "eternity" (aion: a wholly intelligible, wholly fulfilled order of being) and "time" 
What lasts has permanence: at least insofar as it "comes toward us." A tradition is a case in point: it lasts, has an ongoing effective-history (Wirkungsgeschichte), just insofar as it comes toward us (and we toward it) in that activity of mutual engagement called 'interpretation'. Perdurance is enduring-through such an encounter, and it is the most characteristic temporal mode of a text transmitting a tradition: in this respect the Analects, still coming toward us as this text does, is itself a perduring cultural object.
Other perduring objects include natural language and currency systems, various habits and tendencies, world-historical or metaphysical "epochs" as well as strictly local customs and mores, and so on. The list could continue almost indefinitely. What all such concrete cases of perdurance share is a combination of sameness or permanence over time with a capacity to modify or evolve (but this latter only gradually: for "withstanding wear or decay" [O.E.D.] is indispensable to perdurance). Between the fixity, the sheer ever-the-sameness of eternity, and the ceaseless flux of transient temporality (wherein all is everthe-other) stands perdurance, providing sameness and difference, motion and rest, at the same time and not just in succession (as in linear duration). Thus we come upon yet another middle term, one which likewise mediates between extremities.
Hence it is hardly surprising to realize that ritual-itself such a decisive tertium quid in human affairs1 5-exhibits perdurance as its own main temporal mode. This is evident, for example, in Confucius' summation of the ancient Odes as telling us "not to swerve from the right path" ( What matters is once more conduct, how you act ("while a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when his father is dead, look at his conduct" (I:11)), or expression, that is, how you appear as you enact a rite ("Tzu-hsia asked about being filial. The Master said, 'what is difficult to manage is the expression on one's face'" (11:8)). Conduct and expression make manifest the spirit of ritualized activity which, without them, is susceptible to the emptiness of sheer repetition. They also help to make this activity genuinely perduring, and therewith both more readily rememberable and more lastingly memorable. We are again reminded of how perduring implies enduring through: here the enduring of already acquired knowledge through the occasion of its being imparted to others in ever varied forms of expression and of acquiring new knowledge in this very process. Further, consider the statement that "when you know a thing, hold that you know it; when you do not know a thing, allow that you do not know it-this is knowledge" (II: 17). This is to acknowledge the decisive difference between the perdurance of really knowing something and the non-perdurance of the not-known.
(c) character. "Character" is one of the most constitutive features of the human self, and is the primary perduring element of this self in its relation with others. If it is not always true that "one's character is one's fate," character is there to be counted on. It is what remains (hence Freud's temptation to define it as, quite literally, a remnant of human relationships: "a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes ... that contains the history of those object-choices"). 19 Speaking more prospectively, we could say that character is the basis of reliability, and even of much predictability, in human experience. Both aspects of character, backward-and forward-looking, contribute to its perdurability; and it is of considerable significance that both of them are incorporated into the second chapter of Book One of the Analects:
It is rare for a man whose character is such that he is good as a son and obedient as a young man to have the inclination to transgress against his superiors; it is unheard of for one who has no such inclination to be inclined to start a rebellion. It is natural to be so bewildered; but I no longer think that the arrangement of Books I and II is haphazard; and I believe that an organizing principle can be found-not, of course, for every chapter of these books, yet one that is illuminating for many chapters nonetheless.
It is ironically appropriate that this principle has turned out to be precisely perdurance, one of whose very properties is to hold together what is disparate in time and space. Here it helps to hold an otherwise inchoate text together; such is what I have tried to suggest, however sketchily. I realize that my efforts may strike some as imposing the foreign on the already alien, or as attempting to explain the obscure by the still more obscure. If this is so, then I have indeed failed to fuse horizons in Gadamer's sense-which is tantamount to failure to understand a text or a tradition. In defense of my line of interpretation, it will not do to make the imperious (and false!) claim that "nothing human is alien to man": it is precisely the alien from which we always begin in coming to understand something. It is a matter, rather, of asserting thefittingness of an interpretation: and thus I point to the fact that perdurance is, of all modes of temporality, the one most suited to explicate human existence taken on its own nontransfinite terms-taken at the level of experience or action regulated and refined by ritual.22 There are, of course, other temporal modes descriptive of the finitely humanthe retentions and protentions of time-consciousness (Husserl), or Dasein's ecstatico-futural temporality (Heidegger)-but these seem much less fully reflective of the human world at issue in the Analects. And that it is a human, a deeply humanized, world in the first place recommends perdurance over the extremities of endless eternity and the punctiform instant, which are more adequately descriptive of the suprahuman and infrahuman domains, respectively.
VII
Let me attempt, in a few closing words, to come full cycle. My present preoccupation, I said at the outset, is above all with human memory, and the Analects offers precious suggestions regarding that form of remembering which is usually called commemorating. We have learned that this latter is not only an intensified remembering achieved with others (this would only account for its collective aspect) but that it is, more particularly, a remembering-through. Through what then? Primarily through two sorts of things: through ritual actions and through texts, each being a critical place of access to the traditions they incorporate and disseminate.
What must be emphasized is that ritual and text are not in this perspective mere means of commemoration, simple points of support for a re-membering that transcends them to rejoin a distant tradition (as on the Eliadean model of rejuvenating an origin by repeating it). Instead, a ritual or text is itself a commemoration of the tradition it celebrates. Moreover, a tradition perdures in a rite or a word which effects its active remembrance. What Fung Yu-lan has said of texts is true of rites as well:
The I Ching, deprived of its Appendices, is no more than a book of divination; the Ch'un Ch'iu, without such commentaries as those of Kung-yang, is only a collection of dry-as-dust brief court.records; and the I Li, separated from the Li Chi, is only a book of etiquette. In themselves these works could not possibly have possessed the influence which they have exercised during the last two thousand years. It is not the books themselves, but the writings based on them, that have been of outstanding influence in Chinese history ...23
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Freud would have invoked just here the power of "deferred action" (Nachtrdglichkeit), and he would have attributed this power to unconscious memories possessed by individuals. We can agree provided only that we extend the bounds of 'memory' to include commemorating carried out collectively in the reading of texts and in the enacting of rites set forth in these same texts. NOTES 
